Iranian nuclear officials have announced that Moscows proposal can be studied, thus opening a new chapter in the nuclear issue. However, various factors should be taken into consideration if the new plan is to produce favorable results for Moscow and Tehran: A. A review of Irans nuclear dossier over the past three years shows that Tehran has pursued a three-faceted strategy to clear up the international communitys ambiguities over its nuclear activities in a peaceful manner. First, it has cooperated transparently with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on technical and legal issues, in line with international law. Second, it has respected international concerns over the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and observed its commitments as stipulated in the IAEA Charter, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the safeguards agreements. And third, it has refused to renounce its sovereignty and its international right to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, which has been recognized by international treaties for all nations and those countrys future generations. It should also be noted that Iran pursued a patient policy of mutual understanding in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union until August 5, when Europe offered a proposal in overt violation of international law that infringed upon the rights of the Iranian nation. B. And now, although the plan “to establish a Russian-Iranian uranium enrichment facility on Russian soil” is not quite logical and should have at least stated “on both Iranian and Russian territories”, it seems that, from the viewpoint of Iran, this “unclear proposal on paper” could turn into a “viable agreement” that would satisfy both sides. Iran now believes that an agreement with Russia can only be reached if there is a way to guarantee that neither side will divert activities toward a nuclear weapons program and will remain committed to the NPT and if Irans obvious right to develop its indigenous nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, in line with the IAEA Charter and the NPT, is recognized. C. The positive aspects of the Russian proposal that have encouraged Iran to give an optimistic, although conditional, response to the plan are: (1) Russia has been Irans main and unrivalled partner in the construction of nuclear reactors since France and Germany both reneged on their commitments to build light water nuclear reactors in Iran. Naturally, since Iran needs to construct at least 20 more nuclear power plants, an appropriate approach by Russia at this juncture could provide a greater opportunity for it to continue its cooperation with Iran. (2) Russia has always recognized Irans right to make use of nuclear energy in line with NPT regulations and, like the IAEA, has always deemed Irans nuclear activities peaceful. (3) Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrovs recent remarks, in which he said that the NPT is too big to be politicized, shows that at this juncture Russia, as the only member of the UN Security Council that Iran can trust, is not acting politically and is seeking to boost the level of its cooperation with the Islamic Republic and Irans indigenous and peaceful nuclear capabilities. Of course, if Moscow proves that it is acting in line with NPT regulations, it will raise Russias profile in relation to the United States, Britain, France, and China in the international arena. (4) Moscow now has another great opportunity to eliminate Iranians historical distrust of Russians and gain Iranians confidence. Moscow cannot forget the failure of the European Union in the Iran–EU negotiations of the past two years. D. The situation is favorable for Russia to bloom again as a major power in the world if it does the following: (1) According to current agreements, Russia has pledged to transfer fuel to Iran and start up the Bushehr nuclear power plant. As long as Russia does not honor its commitments to Iran, it cannot expect Iran to trust it in any new deals. (2) Since promoting and strengthening ties with Iran is in Russias long-term and strategic interests, their proposal, which is a short-term one, must guarantee nuclear development and research, technology transfer, and peaceful cooperation in a greatly expanded framework. (3) The Russian proposal refers to “temporary” enrichment on Russian soil, which is a positive point, but one cannot expect a major power like Russia to make a mistake in its strategic calculations, overlook its long-term interests, and view an important matter like uranium enrichment as temporary. (4) The most important criteria for the examination and success of the Russian proposal are undoubtedly the level of Irans participation and, in fact, Irans share of technical, financial, and proprietary aspects in the proposal. (5) Moscow knows better than Tehran that if it tries to mix up its nuclear talks with Tehran with the Iran-EU negotiations and with Irans relations with the IAEA, that would be the coup de grace ending the Russian proposal. (6) In contrast to the remarks of Russian Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Chairman Konstantin Kosachev, who said that the Russian proposal is the “only solution”, Iran has various solutions in mind, but prefers not to avail itself of them due to Moscows logical and respectful approach. Will Russia lose this historic opportunity to gain Iranians confidence and bloom again in the international arena? PIN/MNA